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Beware of Historians Bearing False Analogies 
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, New York: Random House, 1987. 
Pp.XXV +678. $24.95. 
I 
Paul Kennedy, an Englishman translated to New Haven, succeeds to a proud 
tradition reaching back mor~a half century, including among other dis-
' tinguished scholars from across the Atlantic, Nicholas Spykman and Arnold 
Wolfers, who introduced Yale students of the 1930s to the harsh realities of 
geopolitics, war, and diplomacy. 
Kennedy has written a rather massive book around a grand theme: The rela-
tion between the rise and fall of major powers over the past five centuries to 
shifts in their relative economic strength and technological virtuousity. It 
is, at once, a work of historical analysis in which the author seeks to discern 
recurrent patterns on which he can base defensible generalizations; an analysis 
of the recent past and projection of present trends as he perceives them; and 
a policy prescription, notably for the United States. Understandably, it is 
the latter strand that is receiving much attention in the media; but before 
examining Kennedy's advice to Americans it is worth surveying briefly the 
other two dimensions of his work to which his final admonition is related. 
u. [ - Kennedy begins with a brief survey of the world scene round about 
1500. It includes quick portraits of Ming China, the Muslim world including 
• 
Mogul India, pre-Tokugawa and Tokugawa Japan, pre-Petri ne Russi a, and -Europe 
before the rise of the modern nation states. 
He then brings on stage his succession of melodramas of rise and fall: 
the Habsburgs (1519-1659); the Anglo-French struggle in the wake of brief 
Dutch primacy (1660-1815); Post-Napoleonic British primacy (1815-1885) and its 
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erosion (1885-1918); the rise of the United States and the U.S.S.R. at the 
expense of the middle powers ~ritain, France, Germany, and Japari7 (1919-1942); 
the bipolar world and the beginnings of its erosion (1943-1980).* 
All this takes up approximately seventy percent of the book. It involves 
the mobilization of a large volume of evidenceJmuch of it not directly related 
, to his central theme. Its style evokes something of text books of the past --
say, the second half of H.A.L. Fisher's A History of Europe -- updated, with 
somewhat more economic history, but without ~ Fisher's turn of phrase. 
Sensing the diffuse character of his exposition1 Kennedy provides a ter-se 
ten page Introduction. There he confronts two of the major unresolved analytic 
problems that run through his study and fails to confront a third. First, he 
asks: How much generalization is justified by this tale of battle and blood 
and wasted resources? He distinguishes his position from that of political 
scientists who seek general rules about world systems, recurrent patterns of 
wars, power-distance ratios, etc. The evidence1 he finds, is too conflicting 
for any tidy laws of history. He limits himself to three unsurprising proposi-
tions (pp. xxii-xxiii): 
-- There is a causal link between economic strength and the power position 
of states in the international system. 
In the long run, the rise and fall of states is related to their 
* With justification, «:<.:--...,.---Kennedy takes 1942, with allied victories in 
the Coral Sea, Midway, North Africa, and before Stalingra~as the turning point 
in the Second World War after which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. progressively emerge 
as dominant. In my view the erosion of bipolarity and the diffusion of power 
away from Washington and Moscow began as early as 1948 when the U.S. Congress 
passed the Marshall Plan legislation and Tito successfully broke with Stalin. 
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relative economic position in the world economy. 
--There is a time lag between the trajectory of a nation's relative 
economic strength and its relative military-territorial influence. 
Second, ~'----~0• Kennedy, historian that he is, draws back a bit even from 
this degree of "crude economic determinism." He lists (p. xxiv) other factors 
'that have affected relative national success and failure in the arena of power: 
geography, military organization, national morale, the alliance system among 
others. These are, however, not pursued systematically in the analyses that 
follow. 
Third, is his missing insight:fs: ::l:iel: "g ~ rbv" aej 
slnulJ 11 11 ~: s: il1a h"" ~ls to distinguish sharply 
II t t 1 1 • Q Q j 
those states which 
pursued policies of regional hegemony from those content with a balance of power 
policy; that is, a policy which aimed to prevent the hegemony of any other power 
in their region. In the post-1500 era marked, above all, by the triumph of 
nationalism, it has made quite a difference whether a power set out to suppress 
the nationalism of others or to help mobilize the nationalism of others in 
resisting that suppression. It is a distinction worth making. 
Kennedy does quite well with the great pursuers of hegemony. Thus, the 
Habsburgs, inheritors of a vision of a Holy Roman empire, caught up in a com-
mitment to continental hegemony from which they could never escape, enflamed by 
the flow of bullion from their American colonies, continuously at war, while 
their opponents, resisting attempted domination, enjoyed periods of respite, 
peace, and recovery. We see Napoleon, similarly driven but by a different set 
of forces, impelled literally to install members of his family in his conquered 
domains, generating nationalist opposition the British systematically exploited 
,u 
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to bring him down. Thus also the defeat of the Kaiser, Hitler, and the Japanese 
militarists by the concerted efforts of those not prepared to accept their 
hegemony. Kennedy might well have quoted the Hamletian Chief of the German 
General Staff, in 1914, General Helmuth von Moltke, trapped by the Schlieffen 
Plan he inherited, who foreshadowed his country's fate (and 
Jli~ 
' shockedlass i stants) with the o 1 d German peasants' adage: "Many dogs are the 
hare's Eleath." 
The central problem of Kennedy's analysis and, later, prescription for the 
U.S., centers on his treatment of Great Britain in relation to the other cases 
of rise and decline. There is a passage in Kennedy's book which, I felt, might 
lead him to get it right. It asks a good question: "Britain as Hegemon?" (pp. 
151-158). It evokes Britain at the height of its power, with Europe in reasonable 
diplomatic equilibrium aided notably by Bismark's restraint. It was an equili-
brium about to break down; but it represented a technique for exercising power 
in a multi-polar arena quite different from Britain's predecessors or attempted 
hegemonic successors in Europe. A balance of power state may not be liked; but 
it is almost certain to find allies when it confronts a power intent on regional 
hegemony. 
The British decline thus differs from the others. Its relative role in 
fending off hegemony in Europe by a succession of powers was, indeed, reduced by 
the progressive industrialization of other states. But its relative decline as 
a European and Atlantic power is not the result of pursuing a hegemonic dream 
in Europe. 
Britain did exercise hegemonic powers in the empire; and despite the 
recognition after 1783 that such powers would progressively wane as nationalism 
' 
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gathered strength, the end of the imperial dream was psychologically and politi-
cally traumatic, but not economically costly in any direct sense. That trauma 
postponed Britain's recognition that its destiny lay primarily with the European 
continent; and the initial postponement gave de Gaulle the occasion for further 
delay. The problem that had to be overcome was captured in Dean Acheson's 
namely, that 
somewhat cruel analysis and challenge late in 1962; ~Great Britain had lost 
an empire but~ not yet found a role •. 
The most obvious generalization from Kennedy's saga is political rather 
than economic: the pursuit of hegemony strengthens nationalist resistance, 
expansionist 
renders the . ~ , effort increasingly costly, and out of its own dynamics, 
may drive a state to extend its .exertions - to a point where failure is 
inevitable as it reaches beyond its relative economic capacity. 
As for the economics of the process, a state pursuing a balance of power 
policy may find its relative status shifting as the tricks of industrialization 
spread, but it is not destined to repeat the fate of Habsburg Spain, Napoleonic 
France, imperial and Hitlerite Germany, and Japanese militarism. 
In short, Kennedy's generalizations from the historical record down to 
1942 suffer from a confusion of the British with the other cases, and a con-
fusion of two quite different links between economic resources and power in the 
world arena: the progressive economic strains imposed by the pursuit of hege-
monic dreams in the face of affronted nationalism; and the progressive dilution 
of relative economic power as the British demonstration of take-off, starting 
in the 1780s, is followed for two centuries by a sequence of take-offs in con-
tinental Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East (see 
chart). 
' 
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This distinction becomes central when Kennedy moves beyond 1942 in 
Chapter 7 ("Stability and Change in a Bipolar World, 1943-1980"). He claims 
his stylized portrait of the past forty-five years is based not on~ priori-
theories but, simply, the "historical record." In fact, all historical 
'analyses are based on a theory, explicit or implicit. The form Kennedy's 
theory assumes is a double analogy: he treats the post-1945 rise in _U.S. power 
on analogy with other hegemonic empires of the past; its decline on analogy 
with his interpretation of the decline of Britain. Neither analogy, in my 
view, is particularly helpful. 
Now, his stylized portrait. From 1943, he argues, the United States and 
the Soviet Union interpreted the world in bipolar power and ideological terms 
and acted in those terms. "Manichaen" (p. xx) is his code word as he applies 
rather crudely Alexis de Tocqueville's famous prediction about the destiny of 
the United States and Russia (pp. 343 and 365); although, presumably to per-
serve symmetry, he leaves out: "The principal instrument of the former is free-
dom; of the latter servitude." The two nations are presented as having equally 
fallen prey to "globalist" thinking. Henry Luce (p. 360) is quoted as the 
authoritative spokesman of American policy not Truman, Marshall, Acheson, or 
Clayton. An unnamed "American official" is evoked from a secondary source to 
explain: ''It is now our turn to bat in Asia'' in succession to Britis~ and 
Dutch imperialists (p. 361). American post-war economic policy is presented as 
an effort to exploit free trade and laissez-faire at a time of European weakness 
to consolidate American post-war economic primacy. This is the not unfamiliar 
litany of some on both sides of the Atlantic since the end of the Second World 
War. 
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A full response to this caricature is not appropriate here. But it is 
worth recalling that in 1945-1946 the United States unilaterally dismantled 
its armed forces and gave every evidence in its political life of validating 
Franklin Roosevelt's opening statement at Yalta that American forces could not 
be kept in Germany for more than two years. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall 
' Plan were a belated response to a real and present danger to the balance of 
power -- an assessment fully shared by responsible officials on both .sides of 
the Atlantic, notably after George Marshall's meeting with Stalin in April 1947. 
Similarly, it was the shock of the North Korean attack on South Korea which led 
to the creation of SHAPE within the hitherto rather empty structure of NATO. 
The political instinct of the United States in 1945-1946 was to come 
home from the world as much as possible and rely to the maximum on its member-
ship in the United Nations to keep the peace. In the actions taken in Europe 
the United States was not engaged in a mortal, obsessive, bi-polar duel for -
world power with the U.S.S.R. It was acting in continuity with its policy since 
1917; namely, that it would move at times of acute crisis to redress the balance 
of power in Europe when that balance was palpably threatened. And it acted in 
a particular way. In 1945-1946 the following issue was debated in the U.S. 
Government: Should the U.S. support the unity of Europe at the certain cost of 
creating a great economic competitor, gambling that we would have a strong 
partner in holding the balance of power; or, should the U.S. maximize its short 
run power by exploiting its bilateral leverage over individual European countries? 
Well before the Marshall Plan offer, the U.S. government had decided on the 
former course. It has remained American policy in Europe for more than forty 
years. Washington was the steady friend of Jean Monnet -- his plans and dreams 
\ 
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for a strong Europe -- not exactly the posture one would expect from a power 
caught up in a hegemonic seizure, 
In Asia, too, if one examines what the United States did as opposed to 
the rhetorical sound track, it is clear that the nation acted quite consistently 
since the late nineteenth century in terms of the balance of power. The enun-
ciation of the Open Door Policy had a curious history, as most events in public 
policy do; but it did, in fact, foreshadow U.S. policy towards China in the face 
of the rise of Japanese power in Asia. The balance of power was at the core of 
the American stance at Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese War and in 1921-1922 
. . It reemerqed witn during the negot1ation of the Wash1ngton Naval Treaties, ·1\Franklln Roose-
velt's drawing the line on Japan's expansion in 1941 --with the cutting off of 
oil and scrap exports and the sequestering of Japanese assets in the U.S. --
when Japan's forces moved from northern to southern Indo-China threatening free-
dom of transit in the critical South China-Sea. And so into the more than forty 
years since the end of the Second World War: the defense of South Korea, the 
Japanese Security Treaty, the Southeast Asia Treaty, the defense for twenty 
critical years of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and the reaffirmation of 
the Southeast Asia Treaty as it applies to Thailand by Presidents Carter and 
Reagan despite the tragic outcome of the engagement in Vietnam. There is great 
continuity in this story. 
-
The pursuit of a balance of power policy in Asia has not always been easy 
or cheap. In the face of Nationalist post-war weakness the U.S. government had 
to decide either to move into China with great force or to accept the take-over 
of China by a Communist government. The much crit.iCizea White Paper .. of 1949 made 
the case for the latter course. But the U.S. and its allies then contained 
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expansionist impulse; 
Mao's ,. helped build a vital Asia of strong nationalist governments; 
and, as the U.S. government hoped forty years ago,_ .,.;<;_·;___--?) a different 
China emerged out of its own dynamics having freed itself from the inherently 
un-natural alliance with Russia. The United States took heavy casualities --
as did others -- in Korea and Southeast Asia -- with success in one case and 
' debacle in the other. The Soviet navy is now in Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviet air-
force in the Danang air field complex opposite Subic Bay and Clark Field. What 
is remarkable, however, is that despite the enflamed passions and rhetoric of 
the 1960s and 1970s over Vietnam,~ a balance of power policy is still alive in 
Southeast Asia, with widespread support in the region, including the support of 
China. And Thailand -- always the critical area -- remains independent and 
gathers strength. 
Just as Kennedy does not capture the balance of power roots of American 
policy, he fails to deal clearly with the U.S. nuclear role. The conduct of a 
balance of power in Europe and Asia was, of course, complicated· and rendered 
more expensive for the United States by its role as nuclear guarantor for its 
allies and others opposing Soviet hegemony in both regions. No other nation 
foreseeably 
could or ca~assume tnat function. Moreover, Kennedy does not explain the 
linkage of that posture to the possibilities of limiting or, at least, slowing 
down the process of nuclear proliferation. The U.S. government has stood against 
further nuclear proliferation for good and sufficient reasons as have many other 
governments. And for most countries, an American nuclear guarantee, backed by 
a conventional force presence on the gound or in the neighborhoo~ provides more 
security than a relatively small national nuclear capability. But as the 
' 
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"Supreme National Interest" clause in the Non-Proliferation Treaty makes clear, 
the containment of proliferation is, in good part, a matter of American relia-
bility as an explicit or impricit ally. 
As for the future, I have argued for at least thirty years -- most recently 
in Foreign Affairs. ("On Ending the Cold War," Spring 1987) -- that the global ageRda 
in the several generations ahead will be dominated by the task of accommodating 
peacefully the rise of new industrial powers to full technological maturity. 
This is quite similar to Kennedy's perspective, although I would extend his list 
to include India, Brazil, and other countries in this category (see chart). 
Except for China, they get rather short shrift in his analysis. 
IV 
Now Kennedy's prescription: The U.S. should shift resources from "security" 
to "investment" (pp. xxiii and 540), sacrificing short run military security to 
longer run economic security. It is here his analogy shifts from Russia and 
its predecessor hegemonic powers to his view of post-1945 Britain. 
There are four observations to be made about this piece of advice. 
First, of course·;u.s. military outlays should be the minimum compatible 
with the protection of American vital interests. As a proportion of GNP, mili-
tary expenditures have declined from 13.2% at the peak of the Korean War; to 
8.9% at the peak of hostilities in Southeast Asia (1967); to 6.5% in the fourth 
quarter of 1987. This trend decline is no cause for complacency; but it is 
often forgotten in the rhetoric of spiralling arms races. 
Kennedy is quite aware of the trend but argues it does not take into account 
the relative rise in the economic power of other countries. His view would only 
be valid if the United States was seeking hegemony over those countries. In 
' 
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fact, the rela~ive rise in economic power has mainly occurred 
in countries allied to the United States or where important 
common balance of POWer interests exist (e.g., India and China). 
Second, the prospect is that the u.s. proportionate burden 
may decline further in the future as the result of (i) the 
relative economic rise of some u.s. allies; (ii) arms control 
agreements and other arrangements which reduce military burdens 
for both the u.s. and the U.S.S.R. The image that emerges from 
Kennedy's rhetoric and analysis --of an America in the grip of 
compulsions to a linear expansion in its military outlays 
until it self-destructs -- is justified neither by past trends 
nor by reasonable hopes for the future. 
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Third, desirable as it is, a relative reduction in military outlays does 
not automatically translate into a higher growth rate nor is a relatively high 
rate of growth incompatible with a relatively high rate of military expenditures. 
' For example, the burden of U.K. military expenditures declined in the years 
down to 1978, while the economy continued to deteriorate. Something of the 
same could be said of the American economy in the 1970s as military expendi-
tures declined to a trough of just under 5% of GNP in 1979. On the other hand, 
with a proportionate military outlay higher than the U.S., Taiwan, with 20% of 
U.S. GNP per capita, enjoys a much higher rate of growth. The situation of 
South Korea is similar. The capacity to reconcile a high rate of growth with 
a nation's security requirements is a much more complex affair than Kennedy 
allows. 
Fourth, as I have argued elsewhere and at length, the challenge confron-
ting the United States as it faces a protracted phase of increasing competition 
(see chart) 
from the Fourth Graduating Class~requires much deeper and more radical change 
than Kennedy suggests: for example, improvement in the quality of the American 
educational system; increased co-operation between business and labor as well as 
\ 
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bipartisan approaches to balancing the federal budget; intensified ties between 
military 
the universities and the private sector. Incidentally, despite a high,_claim 
on U.S. R&D resources, the U.S. seems to be maintaining its position reason-
ably well in the generation of new technologies. The critical dimension of 
competition lies in the pace at which entrepreneurs actually bring to bear the 
new technologies in production, a process not closely related to the military 
budget. 
v 
My conclusions about this book are, then, the following: 
The author's failure to distinguish a balance of power from a hegemonic 
policy is a fundamental flaw in his analysis and prescription. 
-- His familiar but still curious view of American diplomatic history con-
ceals the fact that, stripped of rhetoric,the United States has pursued since 
its alliance with France during the Revolution a balance of power policy when 
·ithe chips were down. 
-- The pursuit of a balance of power policy has permitted the U.S. to avoid 
the vicious circle which engulfed all true hegemonic powers over the past five 
centuries; and, I would add, nuclear weapons and a certain historically rooted 
caution, has thus far saved the Soviet Union from that fate, althougn its society 
has been greatly strained by its hegemonic efforts. 
For a balance of power country a satisfactory defense and a vital 
economy are not incompatible if, in David Hume's phrase, they remain "industrious" 
at home and conduct a "civilized" alliance policy abroad. 
VI 
A final word. Kennedy closes with a passage in which he tries to define 
\ 
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the narrow margin open to statesmen (and their societies) in dealing with 
historical forces they can "neither create nor direct" -- a parable drawn 
from Bismarck, in a Hegelian mood, who once set the limit of the possible 
as steering "with more or less skill and experience" on -"the stream of time." 
Kennedy is, I suspect, somewhat more of a central European pessimist 
(although born in Wallsend-on-Tyne) than the majority of Americans. As I 
went through the endless tables of relative economic power that characterize 
the text -- some incorporating my own calculations -- I thought from time to 
time he was taking these trends a bit too seriously. I felt that even more 
while working on this review, 
strongly after readin~~he lead chapter in his Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-
1945. (1983) entitled "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 
1865-1939." It argues that Britain followed wisely a policy of appeasement 
-- of adjustment to the inevitable rise of other powers -- as it felt its pri-
macy waning in the latter part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; that 
Neville Chamberlain was on the right track with Germany but for Hitler's actions 
which "discredited" appeasement and gave leverage to the "unholy alliance" of 
Left and Right which came to oppose Chamberlain. 
In fact, there was more to British policy over the whole period Kennedy 
analyzes than passive adjustment to economic and military power trends; for 
example, the alliance with France after 1900 and the beginning of a sense in 
British policy that an American alliance might in time be necessary to redress 
the balance of power in the old world. 
But my most fundamental disagreement with Kennedy is his tendency to 
regard history as linear. For example he clearly believes that societies can 
not regenerate. He regards calls for regeneration as the province of right 
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wing patriotic politicians trying fruitlessly to swi~ against the tides of his-
tory (pp. xxiii and 529-530). 
I prefer the proposition in my youthful British Economy of the Nineteenth 
Century (1948); "History seems to be tolerant of the individual if he avoids 
the larger illusions of grandeur;" and even more, I prefer Churchill to Bis-
'marck (" ... The course of history ... is always being altered by something or 
other."). Without a conviction that man has a somewhat larger control over his 
destiny than Bismarck and Kennedy suggest the British defeat of Napoleon and 
its remarkable World War II performance would have been impossible as would 
the quite unpredicted post-war regeneration of Western Europe and Japan, and 
a great many other heartening historical events. Indeed, while the media follow 
the presidential primaries in compulsive detail, the process of rehabilitation 
described in the January 29th issue of Fortune proceeds vigorously in a fit of 
public absentmindedness: ''Call the eighties the decade of restructuring. On 
to the scene rode the now familiar horseman of the corporate apocalypse --
global competition, deregulation, accelerating technological change, and the 
threat of takeover." The fact is that the United States is much further along 
with restructuring than Mr. Gorbachev with perestroika; although both countries 
still have considerable distance to go. 
There is a special reason that Americans should lean towards the Churchillian 
view that the margin 
than Kennedy allows. 
Bay of Pigs debacle. 
of control over our destiny is, to a degree, more generous 
~ It was capturedAat a difficult moment in the wake of the 
Presid~nnedy said: 'The British could have a nervous 
breakdown in the wake of Suez, the French over Algeria. They each represent 
6-7% of the Free World's power; and we could cover for them. But we can't afford 
' 
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a nervous breakdown. We're 40%, and there's no one to cover for us. We'd 
better get on with the job.' And so we did. 
But what is the job now? What policy should the United States pursue in 
a world in which much larger, technologically competent, state-of-the-art 
nations seem destined to emerge over, say, the next half century. Although 
quite typically, Professor Kennedy hedges his bets with various formulations, 
his central message is clear: pull back from over-commitment, adjust passively, 
and make a success of the kind of appeasement he believes Britain followed 
until Hitler unfortunately made it impossible. 
I would respond: the United States should stick with a new version of the 
balance of power policy we have pursued with some success for more than two 
centuries. Instinctively we know that an old fashioned balance of power policy 
will not suffice in a world of nuclear weapons and multiple major powers. 
We should not forget the array of those who mattered on both sides of the 
Atlantic when, as it often is, the course ~istory would take 
was 'a damned close run thing': for example, Marlborough and 
Washington; Wellington and Lincoln; the pilots in the Battle of Britain and 
at Midway. But the gross disproportion between the power to destroy and 
the frailty of humanity argues that the techniques of power balance should be 
directed to the avoidance, if possible, of the need for that particular kind 
of heroism. 
A new version of a balance of power policy lies in the broad direction Wes-
tern Europe took, at long last, in the wake of the Second World War, after five 
centuries and more of internecine blood-letting. In order to balance the 
power of Germany on the on.e hand, the United States and the Soviet Union on 
the other, Western Europe moved towards intensified, institutionalized coopera-
\ 
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tion and, perhaps, ultimately to unity. Great Britain could have and should 
have led that effort. for explicable but unfortunate reasons it did not. But 
the fact is that the European community represents a more civilized version of 
the balance of power policy Britain pursued for centuries at times of power 
crisis in Europe. 
The answer for the United States at this historical interval, when its 
relative power and influence while diminished still transcends by far that 
of any other power, is, in a sense, to pursue on a wider basis the policy 
Britain should have pursued toward Europe after 1945; that is, to move 
forward with others to give institutional substance to the profound common 
interests that suffuse the Pacific Basin and tame forehandedly the tensions 
which exist or might emerge; to move similarly in a new spirit of authentic 
partnership within the Western Hemisphere; to tighten the ties of partnership 
within the Atlantic community; and to hold out to the Soviet Union a vision 
of a soft landing from the Cold War and of a United Nations which might begin 
to fulfill the large hopes which accompanied its birth. 
A United States, having recovered economic balance, industrious, as Hume 
counseled, prudently armed,.committed to such a civilized policy and program 
in the face o~iffusion of power also capable of yielding a bloody neo-mercan-
tilist bearpit1 would not lack colleagues and friends along the way. 
In more immediate terms there is a case for adjusting care-
fully and maturely the economic burden·s within the alliances 
across the Atlantic and Pacific in the light of recent shifts 
in relative economic and technological capacity. There is no 
' 
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case for radical change in the structure or purposes of 
those alliances, committed as they are to both defense and 
conciliation, arms and arms control. On the contrary, their 
steadiness and continuity are fundamental to the possibility 
of a successful transition from where we are to a liquidation 
of the Cold War. Another blind American retraction, as in 
1945-46 and the 1970's, which Paul Kennedy's false analogies 
tend to encourage, could destroy that possibility. 
